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I. INTRODUCTION
The threat of climate change is prompting Congress to
consider legislation aimed at regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs).
If and when this legislation passes, it will create new regulatory
mechanisms for controlling GHG emissions, likely including a cap-
and-trade system. The future of these legislative efforts is unclear,
however, and short-term prospects for new legislation seem slim.
Comprehensive and proven air pollution legislation already
exists in the form of the Clean Air Act (CAA), which grants the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) a variety of
tools to regulate air pollutants.' Long before recent debates about
new climate change legislation, possible regulation of GHGs under
the CAA had been discussed by courts, scholars, stakeholders, and
the EPA itself. Most notably, the Supreme Court's well-known 2007
ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA settled the question of whether
GHGs could be regulated under the CAA.2 Ever since the decision,
the EPA has been working to promulgate such regulations. This
process was relatively slow under the Bush administration, but has
been somewhat quicker under the Obama administration.
To date, the EPA's efforts to regulate GHGs under the CAA
have focused almost exclusively on GHG emissions from vehicles-
so-called "mobile sources." Most significantly, in December 2009,
the EPA finalized its "Endangerment Finding" under section 202
of the CAA for GHGs, which both allows and requires regulation
of pollutants from mobile sources.3 These new regulations were
1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 7 401-7671q (Westlaw 2010).
2. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (finding that carbon dioxide and
other GHGs are "pollutants" under the CAA and that the EPA therefore must consider
regulating them under section 202 of the Act).
3. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009)' [hereinafter Endangerment Finding].
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finalized on April 1, 2010.' An implicit understanding has existed
for some time that the EPA would move to regulate mobile sources
under the CAA as required by Massachusetts v. EPA, while Congress
would pass new legislation aimed at "stationary sources"-primarily
industrial facilities and power plants. This new legislation would
most likely create an emissions trading (cap-and-trade) system.
Climate legislation is currently stalled in the Senate, however, and
the EPA is now faced with questions of whether and how to
regulate stationary sources under the CAA. The EPA appears to
have answered the first of these questions by deciding to move
ahead with at least some regulation of stationary sources.5 The
question of how and under which programs stationary-source
GHGs will be regulated, however, remains open. The Agency
believes that it has a relatively wide variety of options available to it
for regulating these stationary-source GHGs under the statute.6
In this paper, I argue that the EPA likely lacks much of the
regulatory discretion it claims to have to regulate GHGs under the
CAA, and that the EPA will probably - at least initially - be forced
down a narrow regulatory path that is generally considered a poor
fit for addressing the GHG problem. Specifically, the EPA may be
forced to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
under sections 108 through 110 of the CAA.7 The reasons for this
lie in interconnections and statutory triggers built into the CAA
itself. First, the EPA has already made broad claims in its recent
section 202 Endangerment Finding that GHGs endanger public
health or welfare.' These are the only substantive determinations
necessary to fulfill the requirements for NAAQS regulation in
4. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, (to be published in the Federal Register), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/ldv-ghg-final-rule.pdf.
5. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,476-520 (proposed July 30, 2008) [hereinafter ANPRI (proposing and
discussing alternative CAA regulatory schemes for stationary GHG sources); see also
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Tide V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74
Fed. Reg. 55,292 (proposed October 27, 2009) [hereinafter Proposed Tailoring Rule]
(proposing restriction of new source review of stationary GHG sources to "major"
emitters).
6. ANPR, supra note 5, at 44,476 ("In this section, we explore three major pathways
that the CAA provides for regulating stationary sources, as well as other stationary source
authorities of the Act, and their potential applicability to GHGs.").
7. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (Westaw 2010).
8. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,497 (stating that "the Administrator
finds that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to
endanger public health and to endanger public welfare").
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section 108 of the CAA.9 Second, the statutory interpretation on
which the EPA relies for its position (that it retains discretion
despite this finding of endangerment) was rejected by a Federal
Court of Appeals more than thirty years ago.'" The basis for the
EPA's belief that a court would decide the issue differently now -
the intervening decision in Chevron v. NRDC - is likely
insufficient." The legal process that will lead to resolution of this
question is already underway. At least one environmental group
has petitioned the EPA seeking regulation of GHGs under the
NAAQS.
1 2
The reasons why this process will, I predict, force the EPA to
regulate GHGs under the NAAQS are relatively technical. 'Their
roots are in analysis of the CAA itself and in judicial doctrines of
statutory interpretation. There are important real-world
implications, however. The NAAQS program that the EPA would
be forced to implement is widely believed to be a poor choice for
regulation of GHGs. The program is in many ways conceptually
inconsistent with the GHG problem, is slow, and precludes
regulation under other CAA programs that might be a better fit.
As a result, regulation of GHGs under the CAA may be more
complex, more expensive, and otherwise more problematic than it
would otherwise be.
The implications of using the NAAQS program to regulate
GHGs are significant-if the EPA lacks the flexibility it claims to
have, pressure on Congress to pass legislation that would
supersede EPA CAA authority would increase. The likelihood of
drawn-out litigation would also increase and the courts might then
force the EPA to act more quickly than the Agency would prefer,
stretching Agency resources and possibly undermining the quality
of eventual regulation. The political fallout for courts and the EPA
could also be significant if either or both are perceived to be
imposing a suboptimal but vast regulatory program in an
undemocratic fashion.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
10. See NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding issuance of aii
quality standards under section 108 of the CAA is not discretionary).
11. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12. See, e.g., CTR. FOR Bio. DIvERSrrY & 350.oRG, PETITION TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL
POLLUTION LIMITS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT BEFORE THE





II. STRUCTURE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Clean Air Act is among the most complex regulatory
statutes in American law. It creates a wide variety of regulatory
schemes targeted at different types and sources of air pollution,
grants significant discretion to the EPA in implementing these
schemes, and divides regulatory responsibility between federal and
state governments. 3
The majority of the CAA is devoted to regulation of air
pollution from two types of sources: mobile and stationary.
Generally speaking, mobile sources include vehicles and vehicle
engines (primarily cars), and stationary sources include power
plants and industrial facilities. The mobile source regulatory
provisions in Title II of the CAA allow the EPA, among other
things, to set federal emissions standards for new vehicles (section
202) 14 and to regulate fuel additives (section 211).
The CAA provides that stationary sources may be regulated
under one or more of three regulatory schemes. First, the EPA can
set NAAQS under sections 108 through 110 of the Act. 6 The states
are then charged with maintaining the NAAQS through state
implementation plans (SIPs) that must be submitted to the EPA. 7
Only six pollutants are currently regulated through NAAQS, and
none have been added since the 1970s.18 Nevertheless the NAAQS
are the most significant regulatory* program in the CAA-the
Supreme Court has called the NAAQS "the engine that drives
nearly all of Title I [stationary source regulation] of the CAA."' 9
Second, the EPA can set new source performance standards
(NSPS) under CAA section 111 that require new and modified
emissions sources to implement specified systems for pollution
control.20 States must then regulate existing sources according to
13. For an overview of the structure and function of the CAA, see generally THE
CLEAN AIRACT HANDBOOK (David P. MartineauJr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2005).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (Wesflaw 2010).
15. Id. § 7545.
16. Id. §§ 7408-7410.
17. Id.
18. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.2-50.16 (Westlaw 2010); see also EPA Air and Radiation, National
Ambient Air Quality Standards, www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html .(last visited Feb. 12, 2010)
(listing the NAAQS for the six criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen
dioxide, particulate matter PM 10, particulate matter PM,.,, ozone, and sulfur dioxide).
19. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
20. See42 U.S.C. § 7411.
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guidelines set by the EPA.21
Third, under section 112 of the CAA, the EPA can regulate
"toxic" pollutants (hazardous air pollutants, or HAPs) believed to
be particularly dangerous to health or the environment by
imposing strict national emissions standards.22
A. Interconnected Schemes for Regulation of Air Pollution
Among the most important features of the CAA are
connections between these regulatory schemes and other elements
of the statute. Regulation of a pollutant under one provision of the
CAA will likely trigger regulation under other provisions, or at
least force the EPA to consider regulation elsewhere. The various
provisions of the CAA are best understood not as independent
regulatory islands but as part of a more-or-less comprehensive
framework for addressing air pollution.
One example of these interconnections is the permitting
provisions of the CAA. Under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) Program detailed in sections 160 through 169
of the CAA, new or modified emissions sources must undergo a
detailed permitting process.23 This requirement applies to any
facility where emissions of a pollutant subject to regulation under
the CAA exceed a specified threshold.24 In practice, this means that
the EPA lacks discretion to decide which kinds of emitters have to
go through the permit process. As soon as the EPA decides to
regulate emissions of a pollutant under almost any provision of the
CAA, however, PSD permitting is required for all new or modified
facilities that emit the regulated pollutant at levels above the
statutory threshold. This mandatory interrelationship will impose
substantial economic and administrative costs if and when GHGs
are regulated under the CAA. This trigger is also the source of
substantial concern for the EPA. The Agency's recently proposed
"tailoring" rule is an attempt to avoid the PSD permitting
21. Id.§7411(c).
22. Id. § 7412.
23. Id. §§ 7470-7479.
24. Id. § 7475(a) (3).
25. The EPA recently reexamined the link between PSD permit requirements and
regulation of a pollutant under other CAA provisions, and broadly confirmed the
traditional legal interpretation described here. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of
Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75
Fed. Reg. 17,004 (April 2, 2010).
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requirement for small emitters of GHGs as the Agency moves to
regulate these pollutants under the CAA. 6
B. Endangerment Provisions
Another important link between various regulatory schemes in
the CAA, and ultimately the focus of this article, is the presence of
similar threshold requirements in many of the statute's schemes.
These similar provisions require the EPA to establish that a
pollutant "cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,""
and are therefore termed "endangerment" provisions, requiring
an "endangerment finding" before regulation can proceed.
Endangerment provisions are found in section 108 (NAAQS),28
section 111 (NSPS),29 section 202 (vehicle emissions standards),"
and section 211 (fuel additives) 3' of the CAA, among others. Many
of these endangerment provisions are also framed by mandatory
language, such that if the EPA does make a positive endangerment
finding, it is compelled to regulate. These endangerment
provisions therefore simultaneously act as threshold requirements
and regulatory triggers. For example, section 202 (a) (1) of the CAA
provides that
[t]he Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . .
standards afplicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any c ass or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.32
Therefore, section 202 of the CAA requires that the EPA issue
emissions standards if it makes a finding that a pollutant emitted
from vehicles endangers (or might endanger) public health or
welfare. Similar mandatory language introduces other
endangerment provisions elsewhere in the CAA.
26. See generally Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 5.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(1) (Westlaw 2010).
28. Id. § 7408(a) (A).
29. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 7521 (a) (1).
31. Id. § 7545(c)(1).
32. Id. §7521(a) (1).
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The mandatory character of endangerment provisions, their
similar language, and their prevalence throughout the CAA create
another significant set of interrelationships and triggers in the
statute. If all of the endangerment provisions in the CAA were
identical, any endangerment finding in one section would seem to
trigger regulation throughout the entire CAA, because fulfillment
of the requirements of any of the provisions for a given pollutant
would fulfill the requirements of all other endangerment
provisions.3 In fact, however, no two endangerment provisions are
exactly the same. Subtle differences between them mean that, in
many cases, an endangerment finding in one section of the CAA
will only partially fulfill the requirements of another
endangerment provision; or, at most would create a presumption
of endangerment under a different section. The first finding
would then not automatically trigger a positive endangerment
finding (and therefore regulation) under other sections. For
example, compare the endangerment language under section
111(b) (1) (A) of the CAA, quoted here, with that of section
202(a) (1), quoted above:
[t] he Administrator shall ... publish ... a list of categories
of stationary sources. He shall include a category of sources
in such list if in his judgment it causes, or contributes
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. [The EPA
is then required to issue NSPS for listed categories] 34
The differences between the endangerment provisions are
subtle but significant. While section 202 (a) (1) refers to pollutants
from vehicles, section 111(b) (1) (A) instead refers to source
categories-that is, classes of' emitters. Furthermore, an EPA
finding under section 202 that a given pollutant from vehicles
endangers public health or welfare would only be relevant, not
determinative, to a finding under section 111. At most, such a
finding would foreclose the argument that emissions from the
source category are not harmful at all, or are not pollutants. The
EPA could still claim, for example, that emissions from a source
category of a vehicle pollutant regulated under section 202 are at
such a low level that the source category does not meet the
33. See ANPR, supra note 5, at 44,419.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
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endangerment criteria and therefore need not be listed and
regulated under section 111.15 Differences. among other
endangerment provisions may offer the EPA similar freedom to
make separate endangerment findings .and, therefore, regulatory
flexibility.
One endangerment provision, however, has created problems
for the EPA when the Agency has attempted to distinguish it from
others within the CAA. The endangerment provision in section
108(a) (1), the entry-point for the expansive NAAQS regulatory
program, is structured in broad language that is very similar to that
in other endangerment provisions." It therefore leaves little room
for the kind of discretionary gymnastics described in the previous
paragraph. The EPA's attempts to exploit its perceived discretion
have resulted in litigation and controversy37 and the CAA's
apparent inflexibility in this regard presents a serious problem for
regulation of GHGs under the Act.
Before discussing the history and character of this problem in
detail, however, it is useful to take a brief detour to. explain the
current status of GHG regulation under the CAA.
III. REGULATION OF GHGs UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Climate change caused by emissions of carbon dioxide and
other GHGs is widely recognized as a serious problem, and has
spurred both international negotiations and efforts to create new
domestic legislation. Under the CAA, the U.S. already has a
comprehensive statute for control of air pollution. The questions
of whether and how the CAA can or should be used to regulate
GHG emissions has spawned much debate and litigation, but, in
2010, may finally be reaching the point where actual regulations
are imminent. Unless Congress acts to circumscribe the EPA's CAA
35. While an endangerment finding under section 202 does not fulfill the conditions
of the section 111 endangerment provision, some environmental groups argue that the
EPA is required to issue some GHG NSPS's. This is due - they argue - not to the section
202 Endangerment Finding, but to the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs
are pollutants. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007). Since the EPA has
already determined that a wide variety of source categories should be regulated under the
NSPS scheme, these environmental groups argue that the EPA must issue GHG NSPSs for
these categories. They do not argue, however, that the EPA must make an endangerment
finding for any new source categories. For a brief discussion of these arguments, see
generally Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under § 115 of
the Clean Air Act, 40 Envtl. Rep.- Current Dev. (BNA) 585 (Mar. 13, 2009).
36. See42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).
37. See generally NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
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authority, the Agency will regulate GHG emissions under the
statute-it is'already well on its way to doing so for mobile-source
emissions. Exactly how this will take place, particularly for
stationary-source emissions, remains an open question.
A. Massachusetts v. EPA Forces the EPA to Act
The Supreme Court's well-known Massachusetts v. EPA decision
in 2007 opened the door for regulation of GHGs under the CAA."
In the case, Massachusetts and other states sued the EPA seeking to
compel the Agency to begin regulating GHGs under section 202 of
the CAA (governing mobile-source emissions)." Under the Bush
Administration, the EPA argued that GHGs were not "pollutants"
within the definition of the CAA, and therefore not subject to
regulation." The Court rejected this argument, overturning the
D.C. Circuit's holding and finding that GHGs were CAA
pollutants.4 This finding brought GHGs within the scope of the
CAA not just in section 202, but also throughout the statute. It did
not, however, immediately require that GHGs be regulated under
the CAA. As discussed above, the regulatory schemes in the statute
have endangerment provisions, requiring an assessment of
whether a given pollutant endangers public health or welfare. The
Court in its ruling therefore ordered the EPA to act on the
endangerment provision of section 202 in one of three ways: by
making an endangerment finding, by making a finding of no
endangerment, or by explaining why such a finding would be
impossible.42
38. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
39. Id. at 504-06.
40. Id. at 513 ("EPA believed it followed that greenhouse gases cannot be 'air
pollutants' within the meaning of the Act.").
41. Id. at 528-29 (finding that "[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA's reading. The
Clean Air Act's sweeping definition of 'air pollutant' includes 'any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical ... substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. . . .' § 7602(g). On its face, the
definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that
intent through the repeated use of the word 'any.' Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt 'physical [and] chemical . . .
substance[s] which are emitted into .. .the ambient air.' The statute is unambiguous.")
(alteration in original).
42. Id. at 533-35.
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B. Endangerment Under Section 202
The Bush-administration EPA did not make an endangerment
decision under section 202. It instead issued an "Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking" in 2008 that, among other things,
detailed possible regulatory approaches for GHGs under the CAA
and requested comments. 43 In contrast, the Obama Administration
has moved relatively quickly to respond to the Supreme Court's
Massachusetts v. EPA directive, issuing a final endangerment
finding for mobile sources under section 202 of the CAA in
December 2009. 44 The current EPA's general position on GHGs is
summarized by its statements regarding the December
endangerment finding:
Endangerment Finding: The Administrator finds that the
current and projected concentrations of the six key well-
mixed greenhouse gases.., in the-atmosphere threaten the
public health and welfare of current and future
generations.
Cause or Contribute Finding: The Administrator finds that
the combined emissions of these well-mixed greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle
engines contribute to the greenhouse gas pollution which
threatens public health and welfare. 5
The mandatory language of section 202 described above will
require the EPA to regulate mobile source emissions once the
endangerment finding is finalized. The EPA formally proposed at
least one component of such regulations in September 2009,
announcing plans for new GHG emissions and fleet fuel economy
(CAFE) standards.46 These standards were finalized in March of
2010.
41
In short, the EPA appears to be well on its way to regulating
GHGs under the CAA. In fact, the endangerment finding means
that regulation under at least one CAA provision, section 202, is
43. See ANPR, supra note 5.
44. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 3.
45. EPA Climate Change Regulatory Initiatives, Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act, available at
http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); see also
Endangerment Finding, supra note 3.
46. Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454
(proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86 and pt. 600).
47. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, supra note 46.
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legally required. This has significant implications not only for the
vehicle and engine manufacturers that will be regulated under
section 202 of the statute, but also because of the
interrelationships between provisions in the CAA for other GHG
emitters.
C. Options for Regulation of Stationary-Source Emissions?
Massachusetts v. EPA, the proposed section 202 Endangerment
Finding, and the EPA's recent regulations are all directed only at
mobile sources of GHGs. In fact, all relate specifically to a single
section of the CAA: section 202. Emissions from stationary sources,
above all from fossil-fuel electricity generating plants, are an even
larger source of GHGs. As discussed above, the CAA contains a
variety of mechanisms for regulating these stationary sources.
In parallel, of course, Congress is considering comprehensive
climate legislation that would likely supersede some of the EPA's
authority under the CAA. The Waxman-Markey climate bill that
the House passed in 2009 would specifically block listing GHGs
under section 108 of the CAA, cleanly resolving the problem
presented in this paper.4" The 2009 Senate Kerry-Boxer bill, at least
in its initial version, contains no such exclusion.49 Early reports
indicate that new legislation proposed in the Senate by Senators
John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman would include
exclusionary language blocking most EPA authority over GHGs
under the CAA.5" Until and unless new legislation is passed,
however, the CAA regulatory process for GHGs will continue.
Many view the EPA as having substantial discretion to decide
the regulatory scheme under which it regulates stationary
sources-NAAQS under section 110, NSPS under section 111, and
regulation as toxic pollutants under section 112, etc. Under this
48. See American Clean Energy Security Act ("Waxman-Markey Act"), H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. § 831 (2009) ("As of the date of the enactment of the Safe Climate Act, no
greenhouse gas may be added to the list under section 108(a) on the basis of its effect on
global climate change.") Note that this would not prevent the EPA from addressing GHGs
under other CAA provisions, including section 202 (mobile sources) and section 111
(performance standards for stationary sources).
49. See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act ("Kerry-Boxer Act"), S. 1733,
lllth Cong. (2009); see also Daniel Morris, Side-by-Side Comparison of Climate and
Energy Legislation, www.rff.org/wv/archive/2009/10/29/updated-side-by-side-
comparison-of-climate-and-energy-legislation.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
50. See Robin Bravender, Senate Democrats, States Wary of Draft Climate Bills Pre-emption




view, the Agency would be able to select the option that best allows
it to design an effective regulatory program for stationary GHG
sources. The EPA's 2008 ANPR takes this view.5' It devotes
hundreds of pages to a detailed analysis of these and other CAA
schemes for regulation of stationary sources, and evaluates the
positives and negatives of each (while requesting comment on all
of them).2 Scholars and commentators who have analyzed
regulation of GHGs under the CAA have also explicitly or
implicitly taken the view that the EPA has a choice among
regulatory schemes.53
This view-that the EPA has unlimited or even broad
discretion among regulatory schemes for stationary sources-is
likely incorrect. Links between different provisions in the CAA
circumscribe the EPA's flexibility to regulate stationary sources. As
the following sections will show, the EPA very likely will be forced
by its section 202 Endangerment Finding to issue a similar finding
under section 108, which will then trigger regulation of GHGs
under the NAAQS framework detailed under sections 109 through
110. The EPA would still retain some discretion in deciding how to
implement the NAAQS, but the option of choosing not to issue a
NAAQS for GHGs will very likely be unavailable."
51. SeeANPR, supra note 5.
52. Id. at 44,476-520.
53. See, e.g., INIMAI CHETTIAR &JASON SCHWARTZ, THE ROAD AHEAD: EPA'S OPTIONS
AND OBLIGATIONS FOR REGULATING GREENHOUSE GASES (Institute For Policy Integrity)
(2009) available at www.policyintegrity.org/publications/documents/TheRoadAhead.pdf;
Larry Parker & James E. McCarthy, Climate Change: Potential Regulation of Stationary
Greenhouse Gas Sources Under the Clean Air Act, Congressional Research Service (BNA) 1
(October 13, 2009); see also Martella & Paulson, supra note 35, at 1; Schnapf
Environmental Law Center, Potential Clean Air Act Authorities for Regulating Green
House Gas Emissions, www.environmental-
law.net/article/documenfs/PotentialCAAAuthoritiesforRegulatingGHGEmissions.pdf
(last visited Nov. 18, 2009); CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2009), available at
www.ccap.org/docs/
resources/614/Clean%2Air%2OAct%20and%20GHGsCCAPMarch%202009.pd. All of
these sources represent the EPA as having a range of options for regulation of stationary
source GHGs under the CAA, and most do not address the issue of legal limits on the
agency's discretion atall. Instead, most of these sources explicitly or implicitly assume that
the agency has full discretion. The Chettiar and Schwartz work is an exception to this, and
its discussion of limits on the EPA's discretion is discussed in detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2
below.
54. The EPA's discretion is further limited because many of the findings that the
agency must make for regulatory programs are scientific, and not purely policy-oriented.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that the EPA is forbidden to consider costs
when setting NAAQS: "Were it not for the hundreds of pages of briefing respondents have
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Whether the EPA has this choice is important. Many observers,
and the EPA itself, have criticized the NAAQS scheme as ill suited
to regulation of GHGs.55 There are three main reasons for this.
First, the NAAQS are in many ways conceptually inconsistent with
the GHG problem.56 The program requires the EPA to set a
national ambient air quality standard, but it is hard to see what this
standard should be for GHGs. Carbon dioxide and other GHGs
are ubiquitous and cause relatively little harm today, however
dangerous business-as-usual emissions will be in the future. It will
be difficult to determine, for example, if a GHG NAAQS should be
set above or below current atmospheric levels. If it were set below
current levels, it would imply that current GHG levels are
dangerous to public health or welfare, which would be relatively
difficult to prove. If it were set above current levels, it would
similarly imply that no immediate action is required. The NAAQS
program also requires states to create plans showing how the
standard would be achieved, but this seems futile given .the global
character of the climate change problem. Unlike the local and
regional pollutants currently regulated under the NAAQS
program, carbon dioxide concentrations are uniform everywhere.
States' contributions to emissions are also relatively small-even if
a state reduced its GHG emissions to zero, it would have almost no
effect on global GHG concentration or on the risk of climate
change. 7
submitted on the issue, one would have thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit
the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards. The language, as one scholar has noted,
'is absolute.'" Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
55. See ANPR, supra note 5, at 44,477-79 (discussing the difficulty of setting a NAAQS
level) and at 44,480-82 (discussing difficulties for states charged with achieving or
maintaining a GHG NAAQS); see also Brigham Daniels et al., Regulating Climate: What Role
for the Clean Air Act?, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,837-38, (March 30, 2009)
(noting that "most speakers at the conference [on CAA regulation of GHGs] argued that,
if at all possible, EPA should avoid using the NAAQS program" and detailing objections to
using NAAQS to regulate GHGs); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The
Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1961, 1966 (2007) (stating that "regulation
of carbon dioxide under the ... NAAQS and ... SIPs of Clean Air Act sections 109 and
110 would likely fail if carbon dioxide were listed as a "pollutant" by the EPA under section
108 of the Clean Air Act"); CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, supra note 53, at 1.
56. For a more detailed account of the conceptual incompatibilities between the
NAAQS and GHGs, see Daniels et al., supra note 55, at 10,838-39; see also ANPR, supra note
5, at 44,477-86.
57. Though the CAA requires states to regulate under the NAAQS, it also provides
authority for the EPA to do so if states fail to act. One scholar has used this fact as the basis
for a proposal to avoid the problem of requiring state-level regulation of stationary source
GHG emissions. Under this proposal, states would submit SIPs, which the EPA would
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Second, the process of listing a pollutant, setting a NAAQS,
and regulating through states also takes a long time. The EPA is
required by the CAA to issue a NAAQS within one year of listing a
pollutant under section 108.58 States then must create and submit
implementation plans for achieving (or maintaining) that
standard within'three years.59 Under this timeline, there would be a
delay of up to four years between the listing of a pollutant and its
regulation. Even if the NAAQS is set at a level below that of current
atmospheric GHG concentrations (so that the entire United States
is "in nonattainment"), states have at least ten years to come into
compliance with the standard." Regulation under the NAAQS
therefore might not be effective for a decade or more. This does
allow the EPA to avoid at least some of the problematic aspects of
NAAQS regulation, and gives Congress more time to act to remedy
these problems (or create a new GHG regulatory program). In the
meantime, however, the Agency would still be prevented from
regulating under some other CAA programs that present likely
preferable alternatives to the NAAQS.
The preclusion of other CAA regulatory schemes is the third
and possibly most serious of the problems caused by NAAQS
regulation of GHGs. The text of the CAA specifically makes some
regulatory schemes mutually exclusive with the NAAQS, including
the section 112 toxic pollutants scheme6' or, most importantly,
performance standards for existing sources in section 111(d).62
Even those programs that would not be directly precluded by
NAAQS regulation might have difficulty operating effectively
reject in favor of a federal implementation plan that all states would share. See Wiener,
supra note 55, at 1967.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2) (Westlaw 2010).
59. Id. § 7410(a). The EPA can extend this period by eighteen months for SIPs
applying only to a secondary NAAQS, bringing the total delay to over five years from the
date of listing. See id. § 7410(b).
60. If the EPA sets a "primary" NAAQS based on dangers to public health, the states
have five years to meet the NAAQS, extendable by the agency to ten years. 42 U.S.C. §
7502 (a) (2) (A). If the EPA only sets a "secondary" NAAQS, based on dangers to public
welfare, states have no specific deadline (only the general requirement that the standard
be met "as expeditiously as practicable"). Id. § 7502 (a) (2) (B).
61. Id. § 7412(b) (2) (stating that, subject to narrow exception, "[n]o air pollutant
which is listed under section 7408(a) may be added to the list"). The existence of this
exclusion suggests that the EPA might be able to regulate under a combination of section
202 and section 112, but not sections 108 and 110. Section 112, with its strict language and
low emission threshold levels, however, is considered by most to be a poor fit for GHG
regulation.
62. Id. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i).
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alongside it. This is perhaps the most significant negative impact if
the EPA is forced down the NAAQS path. Performance standards
are a particularly attractive method of regulating GHGs under the
CAA, and would require use of section 111 (d) to include existing
sources." This would be impossible if a GHG NAAQS exists. These
statutory preclusions come into effect as soon as a pollutant is
listed, exacerbating the problem. The EPA cannot use the delays
inherent in NAAQS regulation to institute a more effective and/or
efficient GHG regulatory program in the short term if elements of
that program are precluded by the first stage of the NAAQS
process. The result is that the EPA may not be able to regulate
GHGs effectively under the CAA in the short term, and may be
distracted by setting up a NAAQS program that will be of limited
value when it is finally implemented.
All of these problems are distinct from those most frequently
identified as arising from the section 202 endangerment finding
and CAA GHG regulation in general-permitting (PSD/NSR)
requirements for small GHG sources. It is these permitting
problems that the EPA's proposed tailoring rule is designed to
address, not those discussed above arising from NAAQS regulation
of GHGs. The tailoring rule, even if it is found by the courts to be
legal or rendered unnecessary by congressional action, will
unfortunately do nothing to alleviate the problems identified in
this paper.
A few commentators have argued that a GHG NAAQS could be
a useful part of broader GHG regulation.' It is true that the
NAAQS are not without some advantages. There 'is precedent, for
example, for creating a cap-and-trade style program for pollutants
regulated under the NAAQS 5 The fact that a GHG NAAQS would
63. See, e.g., Parker & McCarthy, supra note 53, at 11-12 (noting that "[g]iven the
difficulties in following the first two paths [NAAQS and section 112], much of the
attention, including EPA's, has been on the third path [NSPS]"); see also CHETTrAR &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 86-91.
64. See generally Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to
Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic
Sectors, 26 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 227 (2008); see also CHEiTIAR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 78-
86.
65. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport
of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,456-76 (Oct. 27, 1998) (creating an emissions trading
system for nitrous oxides through SIPs submitted under the nitrous oxide NAAQS). The
nitrous oxide trading system is among the largest emissions trading programs in the world
and is widely perceived to have been successful at reducing nitrous oxide emissions at
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be problematic does not, of course, tell us whether other CAA
schemes such as regulation under section 111 (NSPS) would have
problems of their own. They might, and any analysis of the NAAQS
must not fall victim to the "nirvana fallacy"-NAAQS and any other
regulatory option should be compared to realistic alternatives.
Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above, the prevailing view -
both within the EPA and among scholars - is that air quality
standards are a poor fit for GHG regulation. At best, being forced
to regulate through the NAAQS would saddle the EPA (and the
country as a whole) with a suboptimal and expensive regulatory
scheme. At worst, it would do this while simultaneously crippling
the Agency's ability to implement better alternatives.
IV. THE SECTION 108 ENDANGERMENT PROVISION
The source of this triggering link is the breadth of the
endangerment provision in section 108 of the CAA. Section
108(a) (1) of the Act provides:
[f]or the purpose of establishing national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards, the Administrator
shall within 30 days after December 31, 1970 [the date of
enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments], publish, and
shall from time to time thereafter revise, a list which
includes each air pollutant-(A) emissions of which, in his
judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare; (B) the presence of which in the ambient air
results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources; and (C) for which air quality criteria had not been
issued before December 31, 1970, but for which he plans to
issue air quality criteria under this section.'
The EPA must then issue a NAAQS, forcing states to regulate
each listed pollutant.17 After making an endangerment finding, the
EPA retains control over how and at what level a pollutant will be
regulated, but not whether to issue a NAAQS at' all-once a
pollutant is listed, a NAAQS must follow.
relatively low cost.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (a) (1) (Wesflaw 2010).
67. Id. § 7408(a) (2).
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A. The Link Between Section 108 and Section 202
Parts (A) and (B) of the section 108(a) (1) endangerment
provision are relatively straightforward.' Under part (A), the EPA
must determine whether a pollutant "may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"-this is a
detailed scientific inquiry, but a process that is well established by
legal precedent and Agency experience.' Under part (B), the EPA
must simply establish whether emissions of this pollutant come
from "diverse" sources-a factual, even commonsense
observation.7"
These elements of the section 108(a) (1) test are mirrored in
the section 202 endangerment provision and" finding.7 Under
section 202, the EPA must determine if a pollutant - here, GHGs -
endangers public health or welfare, and if it is emitted from
vehicles in the US, a set of diverse sources. The operative language,
"reasonably... anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,"
is identical in both sections.72 The EPA in its proposed section 202
Endangerment Finding is unequivocally claiming that GHGs meet
this CAA statutory standard.7"
Therefore, if section 108(a) (1) consisted only of parts (A) and
(B) there would be no question that the section 202
endangerment finding, when finalized, would compel a similar
finding under section 108. Whether such a finding is in fact
compelled therefore depends on the content and interpretation of
section 108(a) (1) (C). 74
B. The EPA Claims Section 108(a)(1)(C) Grants Unlimited Flexibility
The EPA's stated interpretation of the section 108(a)(1)
provision is that it grants the Agency full discretion to decide
whether to list a pollutant (and, therefore, issue a NAAQS) even if
that pollutant meets the criteria set out in parts (A) and (B).7
Specifically, the EPA claims that a pollutant must be listed only if it
68. See id. §§ 7408(a) (1) (A)-(B).
69. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
70. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(B).
71. Seeid. § 7521(a)(1).
72. See§§ 7408(a)(1), 7521 (a)(1).
73. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 3.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(C).
75. ANPR, supra note 5, at 44,477.
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meets the (A) and (B) tests and the EPA then "plans to issue air
quality criteria" (the part (C) test)." Since the EPA has discretion
over what it "plans," the Agency argues, it therefore has discretion
over which pollutants to list. The EPA relies on this interpretation
of section 108(a) (1) (C) when it presents regulation under the
NAAQS program as a discretionary option in its ANPR. Scholars
who have discussed the EPA's regulatory options for GHGs under
the CAA have implicitly relied on the same interpretation."v
C. NRDC v. Train
The EPA's current interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) is
not new. As one might expect, the Agency considered the key
threshold provision of this major regulatory program in the past
and these interpretations have been the subject of significant
litigation." Perhaps contrary to expectations, however, the
discretionary interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) that the EPA
is now advancing was rejected by a federal appellate court more
than thirty years ago. In NRDC v. Train (1976), the Second Circuit
adopted a narrower interpretation of the statute and denied the
EPA any discretion under this specific provision.79 Since the ruling,
no Agency or other party has challenged the court's
interpretation.
In Train, the EPA offered essentially the same interpretation of
section 108(a) (1) (C) that it now offers here, under very similar
circumstances. The Agency had already made an endangerment
finding under section 211 of the CAA to regulate lead as a fuel
additive, but was seeking to avoid setting a lead NAAQS.s° The EPA
conceded that the section 211 endangerment finding established
that lead met the conditions of parts (A) and (B) of the section
108(a) (1) test, but maintained that "under section 108(a) (1) (C)
of the Act, the Administrator retains discretion whether to list a
pollutant, even though the pollutant meets the criteria of section
76. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (1) (C).
77. See supra text accompanying note 53.
78. See, e.g., NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
79. 545 F.2d at 328 ("The structure of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970, its
legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the Act leave no room for an
interpretation which makes the issuance of air quality standards for lead under section 108
discretionary.")
80. Id. at 324.
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108(a) (1) (A) and (B)."8'
The Second Circuit, noting that, "the issue is one of statutory
construction, rejected this interpretation on three grounds:
canons of statutory construction, the structure of the CAA, and its
legislative history. 3 First, the court pointed to the mandatory
language in section 108 providing that the EPA "shall... publish.
. . a list . . *.."" This language, the court determined, "would
become mere surplusage" if the Agency's interpretation of section
108(a) (1) (C) were accepted.85 The EPA's interpretation, therefore,
would have violated the traditional canon that courts must give
effect to all words in a statute if possible.86 Under the court's
interpretation, section 108(a) (1) (C) retains independent meaning
of its own - it simply establishes that the EPA does not have to go
through the elaborate regulatory process of section 108 and
section 109 for pollutants for which the Agency had already issued
air quality criteria before the 1970 amendments came into effect
(and could therefore more quickly issue NAAQS for those
pollutants). Section 108(a) (1) (C) is therefore a procedural
shortcut available under certain limited circumstances, rather than
a broad grant of regulatory discretion.
Second, in further examining the EPA's interpretation of
section 108(a) (1) (C), the court reasoned from the structure of the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 324-25.
84. Id. at 325 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (1) (Westlaw 2010)).
85. Id.
86. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (stating "[i]t is our duty
'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute"') (quoting Inhabitants of
Montclair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). Of course, rejecting the EPA's
interpretation runs the risk of creating statutory "surplusage" in the form of section
108(a) (1) (C) itself-if it does not give the EPA discretion based on the agency's "plans,"
what does it do? The court in Train therefore took care to establish a role in the statute for
section 108(a) (1) (C), agreeing with the court below that it is directed at the initial list of
pollutants required by the 1970 amendments to the CAA, of which section 108 is a part. See
Train, 545 F.2d at 325.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(C) (Westlaw 2010). An alternative interpretation of
section 108(a) (1) (C) is that it provides discretion to the EPA-to list pollutants that do not
(or may not) meet the 108(a)(1)(A) and (B) criteria, but for which the agency
nevertheless "plans" to issue criteria and regulate with NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. §
7408(a)(1)(A)-(B). This interpretation would give the EPA additional authority to
regulate independent of sub parts (A) and (B), but would not allow the EPA discretion to
refuse to regulate once criteria under (A) and (B) had been met. This interpretation
seems consistent with the Senate Report (on S.4358, 91st Cong., § 2 (1969)) cited in Train.
See 545 F.2d at 326.
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CAA as a whole that regulation of emissions sources (under section
211, section 202, and other provisions) was "a supplement to air
quality standards [under sections 108-110], not an alternative to
them.""8 This conclusion was supported by citation to Supreme
Court interpretations of the CAA's structure. 9 The court in Train
determined that this structural understanding of the CAA
undermined the EPA's position that the statute should be
construed to give the Agency full discretion over setting NAAQS.
Third, the court in Train looked to the CAA's legislative
history, ruling that the congressional record also failed to support
the EPA's interpretation of section 108(a)(1)(C). The court
determined that Congress drafted the mandatory language in
section 108 in response to perceived inaction on the part of states
under the previous regulatory scheme (the Air Quality Act of
1967)." As a result, Congress created a strict, mandatory timetable
for the NAAQS process under sections 108-110. This timetable, the
court, reasoned, showed Congress's intent that listing under
section 108 be mandatory-if it were not, the court claimed, the
timetable would be "an exercise in futility."9'
The most convincing piece of legislative history cited by the
Train court, however, is a Senate report on the bill that became the
1970 amendments to the CAA. According to the report,
[t]he agents on the initial list [of pollutants] must include
all those pollution agents or combinations of agents which
have, or can be expected to have, an adverse effect on
health and welfare and which are emitted from widely
distributed mobile and stationary sources, and all those for
which air quality criteria are planned.92
In this report, the section 108(a) (1) (A) and (B) criteria are
clearly established as sufficient conditions for listing a pollutant,
and the (C) criteria - the EPA's "plans" - as an independent,
88. Train, 545 F.2d at 327.
89. Id. (citing Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 66 (1975)).
90. Id. at 325 (citing the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 465
(1967), amended &y Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Westlaw 2010)).
91. Id. at 327. The court was also able to point to language in a Senate Conference
Report for the 1970 amendments specifically mentioning lead as a pollutant that Congress
"expect[ed]" to be regulated under sections 108 and 110. See S. REP. No. 91-4358, at 454
(2d Sess. 1970).
92. Id. at 326 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-4358, at 454 (2d Sess. 1970)).
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alternative basis for listing. To the extent that this document
should inform interpretation of the CAA, it is powerful evidence
for rejecting the EPA's position.
Based on this and other evidence of congressional intent, the
Second Circuit concluided that the EPA's discretionary
interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) was incompatible with the
legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the CAA. As the
court stated,
[t]he structure of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970, its
legislative history, and the ,judicial gloss placed upon the Act
leave no room for an interpretation which makes the
issuance of air quality standards for lead under section 108
discretionary. The Congress sought to eliminate, not
perpetuate, opportunity for administrative foot-dragging.
Once the conditions of sections 108(a) (1) (A) and (B) have
been met, the listing of lead and the issuance of air quality
standards for lead become mandatory."
D. Is Train Still Good Law?
The Second Circuit therefore comprehensively rejected the
same interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) that the EPA recently
offered in the ANPR. The holding of the court in Train has not
been challenged in more than thirty years, and the lead NAAQS
that the decision forced the EPA to set remain in effect.94 How,
then, can the EPA's current position be justified? In the ANPR, the
EPA offers its defense:
With respect to the third criterion [section 108(a) (1) (C)],
while there is a decision of U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit to the contrary, NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320
(2nd Cir. 1978) (sic), EPA notes that that decision was
rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
v. Natural Resources Defense Council ... Thus, a proper and
reasonable question to ask is whether this criterion affords
EPA discretion to decide whether it is appropriate to apply
the NAAQS structure to a global air pollution problem like
GHGs.9 5
93. Id. at 328.
94. See EPA Air and Radiation NAAQS, supra note 18.
95. See ANPR, supra note 5, at 44,477 n. 229 (citing Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
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In short, the EPA believes that the redefinition of the level of
deference shown to Agency interpretations of statutes established
by Chevron gives it another shot at its favored interpretation of
section 108(a) (1) (C). 9" The Agency will almost certainly get the
opportunity to test this theory. Now that it has issued its final
section 202 Endangerment Finding, environmental groups have
already filed petitions under the CAA seeking to compel the EPA
to issue a GHG NAAQS, much as the NRDC sued in Train to
compel issuance of a lead NAAQS.97 The next section analyzes the
EPA's chances of success in such a suit.
V. CAN THE EPA REINTERPRET SECTION 108?-THE CHEVRON
QUESTION
A. Can Train Be Distinguished?
The EPA's claim that it now has a new opportunity to prevail in
litigation regarding the interpretation of section 108 (a) (1) (C) is
surely correct as a procedural matter. First, amendments to the
CAA since 1.976 have given the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction
over CAA litigation." The Second Circuit's holding in Train will
therefore have (at most) persuasive impact, rather than
precedential value.9 Second, the EPA will argue that Train and a
96. 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (C).
97. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 3. Some have argued that environmental
groups might refrain from filing suit because they prefer the EPA to have flexibility to
address GHGs. See CHETfIAR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 39. While this may be true for
some - or even most - environmental groups, all it takes is one suit to force judicial
examination of the issue. The EPA would thus be unwise to rely on a perceived lack of a
plaintiff. Environmental groups should also consider carefully whether they want to take
the position that the EPA has discretion over section 108 listings. While the optimal answer
for GHGs might seem to be yes, these same groups might later oppose EPA discretion in
other cases. If the EPA's discretionary interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) were to
prevail, it would be unlikely that the Agency would ever be forced to relinquish it again
under the current, CAA. The Center for Biological Diversity and 350.org have rendered
this controversy academic by petitioning the EPA to issue a GHG NAAQS, and, relying on
Train, claim in their petition that the agency lacks the discretion not to do so. See CTR. FOR
BIo. DIVERSITY & 350.ORG, supra note 12. Interestingly, NRDC, the plaintiffs in Train, have
publicly stated that they have reversed their position on the interpretation of section
108(a) (1) (C) and oppose the Center for Biodiversity's petition. See David Doniger, Policy
Dir., NRDC Climate Ctr., Seminar Address at Resources for the Future: Climate Policy
Under the Clean Air Act (March 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.rff.
org/Documents/RFF-March20l0FW-Transcript.pdf).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (Westlaw 2010) (granting exclusive jurisdiction over CAA
suits to the D.C. Circuit).
99. The somewhat unusual result is that while Train would not carry precedential
value, a contrary decision would overrule Train, since the D.C. Circuit would have
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case regarding section 108 discretion for GHGs concern different
statutory language. Second, new litigation would concern the
linkage between different endangerment provisions-section 202
and section 108 instead of section 211 and section 108 in Train.
This is a distinction without a difference, as the language of the
section 202 endangerment provision fulfills the requirements of
sections 108(a) (1) (A) and (B) in the same way as the section 211
provision does, but the Agency could at least attempt to argue that
this distinction should affect the result. Finally, as the EPA observes
in the ANPR, Chevron could create a basis for deferring to the
EPA's interpretation of the statute.
Similarly, the EPA might argue that NRDC v. Train can be
distinguished because it deals with the initial publication of the list
of criteria pollutants, rather than the revision that listing GHGs
would involve. A recent paper by Inimai Chettiar and Jason
Schwartz includes a brief analysis of a potential challenge to the
EPA's NAAQS discretion and points to this distinction as a source
of possible relief for the Agency.1 °° It is true that the relevant
language in section 108(a) for publication of the list ("shall ...
publish") is different from that for revisions ("shall from time to
time thereafter revise")."' The mandatory language in both is the
same, however,, and the general requirement that the list
"include[] each air pollutant" that meets the (A)-(C) criteria still
applies."°2 Furthermore, it would make little sense for Congress to
have given the EPA no discretion over the initial list but complete
discretion over revisions of it. If this was the case, the Agency could
not only decide not to add new pollutants to the list, it could also
remove pollutants that it had been required to put on the initial
list. The result would be full EPA discretion over the entire list, the
exact outcome that the Train court rejected. The clearest
difference between the initial listing and revision language in
section 108(a) is that the former contains a strict timetable (thirty
days), while the latter specifies only "from time to time
thereafter."'0 ° If the distinction has any value for the Agency,
therefore, it is that it may provide some discretion over the timing
jurisdiction over both that case and any future case regarding the interpretation of section
108.
100. CHETrIAR & SCHWARTz, supra note 53, at 37.





of its listing of GHGs. 14
While in principle any of these distinctions between Train and
a future GHG NAAQS case could support a different outcome,
Chevron is by far the Agency's best justification for such a result.
The remainder of this section will therefore address the impact
Chevron might have.
B. A Brief Overview of Chevron
Chevron purported to modify the standard of deference shown
by courts to agency interpretations of their own statutory authority.
It created a widely cited two-step process for review of such agency
interpretations. First, the reviewing court must determine whether
the statute in question is ambiguous (Chevron Step One). °5 If the
statute is unambiguous, its plain meaning prevails. If, however, the
court determines that the statute is ambiguous, it proceeds to ask
whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is "reasonable"
or "permissible" (Chevron Step Two).6 So long as the
interpretation is found to be within this reasonable range, the
court will defer to the agency. Agency interpretations are therefore
said to receive "Chevron deference."
0 7
Thus, a prediction of how the D.C. Circuit (or the Supreme
Court on appeal) would treat the EPA's interpretation of section
108 (a) (1) (C) requires analysis of whether the interpretation would
survive Chevron Step One and prevail under Chevron Step Two.
These questions overlap to a large extent. Indeed some scholars
have suggested that it would be more useful to treat Chevron as
having only a single step, which asks whether the agency's
interpretation falls within a range of reasonableness or
permissibility."0 This range might be smaller or larger depending
on the ambiguity of the statutory language. Other scholars have
suggested that Chevron may not have changed the deference courts
show to agency interpretations very much,"° or that judges' policy
104. See CHETrLAR SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 37.
105. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
106. Id. at 843-44.
107. See, e.g., ThomasJ. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 842 (2006).
108. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA. L. REv. 597 (2009) (arguing that Step One and. Step Two analyses are
conceptually indistinguishable, and that the two-step approach has resulted in unnecessary
confusion).
109. SeeMiles & Sunstein, supra note 107.
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preferences may be more important than the nominal level of
deference."' Despite these revisionist interpretations of Chevron
and its importance, it is still useful to begin with a straightforward
analysis of the Step One and Step Two questions.
C. The EPA's Interpretation of Section 108 Under Chevron Step One
If a court reviewing the EPA's interpretation of the section 108
endangerment provision did find that this interpretation is
contradicted by unambiguous meaning of the statute, the agency's
arguments would fail at Chevron Step One and the court's inquiry.
would end. This analysis might follow similar lines to that in
Train-the court would first look to its traditional tools of statutory
construction (rather than interpretation), including the canon
against surplusage, and find that the EPA's interpretation is wholly
foreclosed by the language of the statute. The D.C. Circuit has
explicitly held that the three tools of statutory construction set out
in Train are relevant factors at Chevron Step One."' Applying
Chevron in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
the Supreme Court stated that "traditional tools of statutory
construction" allow a reviewing court to determine whether a
statute is ambiguous (and therefore passes Step One).1 2 Fonseca,
however, is a relatively old case by Chevron standards and this kind
of clean distinction between questions of law, reserved to courts,
and questions of application, over which an agency reserves some
discretion, has not generally been applied in more recent cases.
The Supreme Court has nevertheless repeatedly used canons of
construction to resolve Chevron questions at Step One.13 More
110. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 359 (1994) ("The most general finding of the survey was that Chevron had not
made a dramatic difference in the frequency with which the Supreme Court deferred to
agency interpretations of statutes.").
111. Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (2d Cir. 1989).
112. 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (holding that the issue of whether two different
standards in a statute are the same in practice is one for courts, not agencies, to decide. In
reaching its decision regarding differing standards, the Court relied on "traditional tools
of statutory construction" to identify Congress's intent.).
113. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n. 45
(2001). The relationship between Chevron deference and canons of statutory construction
remains an issue of significant debate in judicial and academic circles. See also Stephenson
& Vermeule, supra note 108, at 607-08 (noting this debate and citing a pair of Ninth
Circuit opinions with further discussion); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2105-19 (1990) (discussing the relationship between
Chevron and preexisting interpretive principles).
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deeply, Chevron refers to "the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress" as the legal force that supersedes agency interpretations
of statutes. " 4 The canon against surplusage is intended to reveal
and preserve this intent. It therefore seems to be within the class of
interpretive tools courts could use to resolve apparent ambiguity
and foreclose agency interpretations (as the court in Train indeed
did). The Supreme Court applied another canon of construction
in interpreting section 109 of the CAA in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns."' There, Justice Scalia stated in the majority
opinion that "Congress, we have held, does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes. '"' 6 Like the canon against surplusage, this principle
could also be applied to section 108(a) (1) (C), indicating that
Congress would have been much clearer had it intended to give
the EPA the wide discretion it claims.
These canons of construction seem even more appropriate for
the Chevron Step One analysis given that they both help to resolve
the narrow problem of interpreting statutory language, as opposed
to substantive canons (such as interpretations that avoid
constitutional problems). The Supreme Court has used both types
of canon in Step One analyses. The "textual" canons at issue here
seem less intrusive on the part of courts and are less likely to
encode policyjudgments.
1 7
Supreme Court precedent also suggests that legislative history
and the structure of statutes as a whole are relevant at Chevron Step
One. Therefore even if reliance only on canons of construction
does not satisfy the court that section 108(a) (1) (C) is
unambiguous, the structural analysis of the CAA and substantial
legislative history cited in Train may do so. In Fonseca, cited above,
the Supreme Court used legislative history along with "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to reject the Agency's
interpretation of a statute, much as the Second Circuit did in
Train."' In Dole v. United Steelworkers, the Supreme Court used
114. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
115. 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
116. Id.
117. For more discussion of substantive canons in Chevron cases, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315 (2000); Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of
Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis and the Central Role of Ambiguity
Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
118. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
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legislative history to help establish "the clearly expressed intent of
Congress" and, based on its determination of that intent, refused
to defer to the Agency's interpretation of the statute.1 9 In Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, the Court
further indicated that legislative history is also apparently relevant
when it supports agency interpretations of statutes.120 Not all
judges, of course, believe that legislative history should play a
significant role in court decisions. As discussed below, these judges
may not be much help to the EPA however.'
2 l
The structure of statutes also seems to be relevant for Chevron
Step One analysis. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home, the Court engaged in a
detailed analysis of the Endangered Species Act. 22 The majority
determined that relationships between different provisions of that
statute - its internal structure - were relevant to a determination of
congressional intent.2 1 In his dissent, Justice Scalia relied on
inconsistencies he perceived between the EPA's interpretation of
the statute and its structure to explain why he would have rejected
that interpretation as "unreasonable[] .,"124 With statutory structure
playing a major part in the analysis of both the majority and
dissent, Babbit confirms its place in the Chevron Step One toolkit.
In sum, the three tools that the Second Circuit used to
interpret the CAA in Train - canons of statutory construction,
statutory structure, and legislative history - have all been used in
the progeny of Chevron to determine whether statutory language is
ambiguous under Step One. In this respect, Chevron does not
appear to have changed courts' approach very much. The same
arguments that were used to defeat the EPA's broad interpretation
of section 108(a) (1) (C) in 1976 seem to be just as relevant today.
119. Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 40-43 (1990) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843, for the proposition that a court can reject an agency interpretation of a statute if
the court determines that the agency's interpretation violates clearly expressed
congressional intent).
120. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687; 704
(1995) (holding that EPA's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act is permissible,
based in large part on the legislative history of the relevant term "harm").
121. The EPA might argue that legislative history is less relevant in this context than
it was in Train because Congress foresaw the regulation of lead, whereas it could not have
foreseen GHG regulation. The Court, however, rejected this kind of argument in
Massachusetts v. EPA. See 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007).
122. 515 U.S. at 708.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 722. Use of reasonableness language indicates that this determination
might fit better under Step Two than under Step One.
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The EPA needs to survive Chevron Step One to access the standard
of deference that it believes will permit a new interpretation of the
section 108 endangerment provision. If the same facts that led the
Agency to lose in Train enable a court to find that the statute is
unambiguous, the Agency will be prevented from getting to Step
Two, and any additional deference in the face of statutory
ambiguity is irrelevant. Chevron will have changed nothing.
Ironically, the EPA's best argument to survive Step One may
also be found in Train. There, the Second Circuit suggests that
"[w]hile the literal language of 108(a)(1)(C) is somewhat
ambiguous, this ambiguity is resolved when this section is placed in
the context of the Act as a whole and in its legislative history.'
25
Superficially, this statement seems helpful to the EPA: if the
court in Train, having marshaled all the evidence at its disposal,
still determined that the statute was ambiguous, one would think a
post-Chevron court would find similarly, and permit the Agency to
reach the deferential Step Two. The Second Circuit's statement,
however, should not be viewed as conclusive on the issue of
ambiguity. In 1976, the Second Circuit was not using "ambiguous"
in its post-Chevron sense, as a talismanic ticket to increased
deference. The word was not magic in 1976, and it should not
carry as much meaning as it would if a modern court was to make a
similar declaration. Second, the court's statement is best read only
as an indication that the statute is superficially ambiguous. After
declaring the statute to be "somewhat ambiguous," the court
immediately states that "this ambiguity is resolved" by the structure
and legislative history of the CAA. This analytical move is no
different from that which a post-Chevron court would make: if
legislative history, canons, and structure of statutes are ever
relevant under Step One, it must be when plain language alone is
not enough to render a statutory provision unambiguous on its
face. If such clearly unambiguous language were necessary for
agencies to lose at Step One, there would be no need to bring up
other evidence of congressional intent at all. In short, the quoted
language from Train is best read as indicating that the statute is not
ambiguous once all relevant information is considered. For these
reasons, an attempt by the EPA to use Train for its own benefit to
escape defeat at Chevron Step One would probably fail.
. In their commentary on a post-Chevron reinterpretation of
125. NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1976).
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section 108 (a) (1) (C), Chettiar and Schwartz argue that legislative
history and statutory structure evidence may not be as compelling
as they were in Train. Some statements in the legislative history
couch revisions of the section 108 list (as opposed to the initial
list) in permissive, rather than mandatory language. 12 ' As discussed
in Section 5.1 above, however, the revision language in section
108(a) is just as mandatory as the initial listing language and
subject to the requirements of section 108(a)(1)(A)-(C). The
language cited in the legislative history (e.g., that the EPA "can
add to the list periodically")' 121 can also be interpreted not as
indicating that the Agency has discretion to decide not to list a
pollutant, but as expressing uncertainty about whether additions
will be necessary.
2
Chettiar and Schwartz also note that the structure of the CAA,
both in the statutory language and in practice, has changed
somewhat since Train was decided.129 It is now common practice,
they note, for the EPA to regulate emitters of some pollutants by
setting NSPS under section 111 of the CAA even though those
pollutants may not be listed under section 108 and regulated with
a NAAQS.5 ° These "designated pollutants" were not a feature of
CAA regulation in 1976 (they are in large part the result of
changes to the section 111 endangerment provision in 1977
amendments to the CAA). This fact is unlikely to change the result
in a case over the link between section 202 and section 108,
however. There have been no changes to the endangerment
provisions in either of those sections (or that in section 211, the
subject of Train).
The court in Train does make general statements that
regulation in the CAA by air quality standards (sections 108-110)
and by performance standards (section 202, section 211, section
126. CHETTIAR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 37.
127. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 436-39 (1970)).
128. This distinction is admittedly harder to draw from Chettiar and Schwartz's third
quote from the Senate Report: "If the Secretary subsequently should find that there are
other pollution agents for which the ambient air quality standards procedure is appropriate,
he could list those agents." S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436-39 (1970) (emphasis added by
Chettiar and Schwartz). The court would therefore have to weigh this statement against
the other legislative history cited in Train and available elsewhere. For the reasons
discussed in Section 5.1, however, it seems very unlikely the court would determine that
section 108(a) gives the EPA discretion over revisions to the pollutant list, but not over the
initial listing, the conclusion that this quote from the Senate Report seems to support.
129. CHETrlAR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 36-39.
130. Id. at 38.
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111, etc.) are intended to be parallel, not separate programs."'
These general statements may no longer hold with respect to
section 111. Still, there is no reason for a court to conclude that
the specific exception created by Congress in the 1977
amendments should extend to regulation under section 202 or
section 211, when no changes were made to those sections. 3 2 If
anything, it should increase a court's confidence that the structure
of the CAA indicates that the NAAQS and mobile source
regulation are intended to operate together. The 1977
amendments to section 111 show that Congress clearly knows how
to authorize independent regulation through performance
standards while the fact that section 202 and section 211 were not
changed then, or since, is evidence that Congress intended no
such independent regulation under these schemes.
The legislative history and the changes in statutory structure
identified by Chettiar and Schwartz will be examined by a court,
but overall they seem unlikely to significantly weaken either type of
evidence in Chevron Step One analysis. The result indicated by the
analysis presented above - that the Train decision and its legal
foundations will prove sufficient for a modern court to declare the
statute unambiguous - is the most likely result of new litigation
over section 108(a) (1) (C). It is nevertheless possible that a court
would find some ambiguity and that the Agency would therefore
survive Chevron Step One analysis. Some examination of the
likelihood of success on Chevron Step Two is therefore useful.
D. The EPA 's Interpretation of Section 108 Under Chevron Step Two
Should the EPA survive Chevron Step One, its chances for
success are much greater. At least as of 2006, the Supreme Court
had never ruled against an agency decision of law in Step Two
(though some appellate courts have made such rulings)."' Step
Two is true "Chevron deference." As some D.C. Circuit judges i"4 and
131. NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1976).
132. See 1977 Amendments to the CAA, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1405 (1977).
133. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PoLIcY 247
(6th ed. 2006).
134. See, e.g., Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Chevron Step Two analysis and "garden-variety APA review"
often overlap in judicial practice); Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 897 F.2d 1151, 1151-52 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing panel for




some scholars15 have observed, Step Two is difficult to separate
from Step One ambiguity analysis and traditional Administrative
Procedure Act arbitrariness review of agency decisions (as opposed
to interpretations of law).' Step Two analysis often includes
detailed review of agency decision-making processes, much like
arbitrariness review.'37 No such decision-making process is present
for the EPA's interpretation of the section 108 endangerment
provision, however. This could be evidence that review of this
interpretation fits better in Chevron Step One-the Second
Circuit's analysis in Train of essentially the same question certainly
has much more in common with post-Chevron cases decided on
Step One grounds than those decided on Step Two grounds.
If an agency's action does, however, survive to reach Step Two,
the court will have to base its analysis on the same types of
evidence discussed above for Step One. The question under Step
Two is, of course, somewhat different. Where Step One may be
viewed as an attempt by the court to determine whether traditional
interpretive tools can resolve a statute's meaning to a point, Step
Two allows the court to determine whether an agency's
interpretation falls within a reasonable or permissible range."'
Despite this distinction, the facts that tend to show whether the
agency's interpretation is outside this range are the same as those
that can be used to determine if ambiguity exists in the first place.
Canons of construction, statutory structure, and legislative history
all narrow the reasonable range of interpretation' by excluding
certain views of a statute. Indeed, these two inquiries may be so
similar that there is no real difference in practice, and the decision
of whether to frame a decision in Step One or Step Two may be
somewhat arbitrary or driven by exogenous factors.'39
Given the lack of any significant precedent for decisions
against agencies on Step Two grounds, it is generally difficult to
135. Seegenerally Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 108.
136. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (Westlaw 2010).
137. See, e.g., Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 443-58 (2d Cir. 1989)
(providing detailed analysis of multiple provisions of Chevron Step Two in the context of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (Westlaw 2010)).
138. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 108, at 600.
139. Courts might, for example, perceive a risk that decisions against an agency on
Step Two would be more likely to be reversed on appeal, or believe that Step One




foresee the EPA's interpre*tation of section 108(a)(1)(C) being
rejected at this stage. Victory for the Agency would not be certain,
however. The strong evidence for a non-discretionary
interpretation of the provision cited in Train is just as relevant in
Step Two as in Step One, and could be enough for a court to rule
against the Agency. The dissimilarities between a hypothetical suit
over section 108(a) (1) (C) and most Chevron Step Two cases also
point toward a tendency on the part of courts to resolve such
narrow questions of statutory interpretation (or construction,
depending on one's point of view) at Step One. This just does not
look like a Step Two case, but even if it is treated as one, the
Agency still might not win it.
E. Other Perspectives on Chevron's Impact
Some scholars who have analyzed court review of decisions
since Chevron have come to the conclusion that judges' policy
preferences play a significant role, possibly exceeding that of the
level of deference nominally shown to agencies."' Research shows,
for example, that while "conservative" Justices on the Supreme
Court are more likely to invalidate agency decisions than "liberal"
Justices on the Court, the Justices are more likely to validate
decisions from agencies under ideologically similar presidential
administrations."' Viewed from this legal realist perspective, the
EPA's chances of securing a new interpretation of the section 108
endangerment provision seem even bleaker.
In a suit over the interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C), the
EPA would likely be defending its interpretation against a
challenge from environmental groups, much like it attempted to
defefid its preferred definition of "pollutant" against the pro-
regulation states in Massachusetts v. EPA. Conservative Supreme
Court Justices such as Justice Thomas or Justice Scalia, who might
arguably prefer a result that did not compel regulation, are
historically also the most likely Justices to reject agency
interpretations in Chevron cases. They are also the most likely to
rule against agencies under Democratic administrations (though
this latter data point may have less relevance, since the EPA would
be sued from its leftward flank). Similarly, those Justices that might
ideologically favor the plaintiffs in such a suit are traditionally
140. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 107, at 823-27.
141. Id. at 823-27, 833-34.
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highly deferential to agency interpretations. 14 2 If the Supreme
Court reviews a D.C. Circuit decision on this issue, therefore, the
chances of cobbling together a five vote majority for the Agency's
interpretation seem remote.
Another way of looking at the politics of the Court is that the,
EPA would essentially be asking the majority in Massachusetts v.
EPA to switch their votes rejecting one agency interpretation of a
term in the CAA, and instead accepting another agency
interpretation of a different provision. In both instances, agency
interpretations would result in less regulation. Of course the facts
would be completely different in a section 108(a) (1) (C) case, but
the research of Sunstein and Miles shows that the Justices' levels of
deference to agencies is somewhat stable over time.' This
research analyzes the Supreme CourtJustices' voting patterns over
a series of cases, and does not claim to predict outcomes in any
specific case. The study is relevant, however, in that it shows that a
vote for the EPA in a section 108(a) (1) (C) case would be at odds
with the general voting pattern of many of the Justices on which
the EPA might expect to rely. If the Justices in the majority in
Massachusetts v. EPA do vote in line with their historical pattern,
the Agency would have to hope for an odd coalition of Justices that
are either ideologically opposed to the result sought by the
plaintiffs or exceptionally willing to show deference to agencies.
F. A Broader View
This case raises broader issues related to Chevron and the
judicial review of agency interpretations. The first of these is the
intersection between Chevron and stare decisis principles. As
mentioned above, the D.C. Circuit in a hypothetical case over the
EPA's interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) would be reviewing
the issue de novo and thus the Second Circuit's holding in NRDC v.
142. The ideological positions in this hypothetical case might be somewhat hard to
characterize. If mainstream environmental groups support the EPA's position, and the
plaintiffs appear to be only fringe groups, "liberal" Supreme Court Justices might be
relatively more likely to favor the Agency's position. If this is the case, then those same
Justices' traditional deference to agency interpretations would support, rather than
counter, their liberal ideological position. As a result, an Agency victory might be more
likely. If, on the other hand, mainstream environmental groups act as plaintiffs, or file
briefs in favor of a non-discretionary interpretation of the provision in question (perhaps
for strategic reasons), the "liberal" Justices will face a clash of their traditional preferences,
as described above. See also supra text accompanying note 97.
143. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 107, at 823-27.
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Train would not hold precedential value.
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services, the Supreme Court held that "[a] court's prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.""' Thus the
precedential value of previous cases appears to hinge on the same
ambiguity finding that courts today have to make at Chevron Step
One. Some scholars have criticized the focus on ambiguity here
and in Chevron cases generally.'45 As mentioned above, pre-Chevron
courts could not have known their declarations that a given text
was ambiguous or unambiguous would later be given such effect.
They similarly could not have used Chevron and its extensive
progeny to determine what tools and methods were appropriate
for determining ambiguity. Some courts might have declared
statutes unambiguous using methods that would now be
considered outside the boundaries of Chevron Step One, and
others might have declared statutes ambiguous when full use of
the tools now available under Step One would have led them to a
different conclusion.
With respect to the Train court, this dilemma is particularly
salient. As discussed above, the Court called the language in
question "somewhat ambiguous" before ruling that this ambiguity
"is resolved" once certain tools are applied (the canon against
surplisage, the statutory structure, and legislative history).' A
court revisiting the issue today could, citing National Cable, simply
disregard Train as precedential or persuasive because the Second
Circuit declared the statute to be ambiguous. On the other hand,
as also discussed above, the best reading of the Second Circuit's
statement is that it believed the statute was not ambiguous.'47 Even
if one disagrees with that interpretation, the result is that Train
itself is ambiguous on this point, which is profoundly unhelpful. In
short, National Cable does little to resolve the stare decisis issue here,
and a case re-litigating the interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C)
may illustrate that its value is limited generally.
144. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
145. See generally Slocum, supra note 117.
146. Train v. NRDC, 545 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1976).
147. See Section 5.3 above.
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A second issue is strategic: if the EPA really believes that, given
Chevron, its interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) is now legally
valid, why has it waited thirty-four years to challenge Train? Surely
the Agency must have considered regulating some pollutant under
section 211, section 202, or some other CAA provision that would
have triggered Train's presumption of endangerment under
section 108. The EPA has not even issued NAAQS for any new
pollutant since lead was added to the list in the wake of Train. This
implies, but does not prove, that the EPA adhered to the non-
discretionary interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) established by
Train even after Chevron gave the Agency an opportunity to
challenge that interpretation (that is, until the Agency advanced its
new, discretionary interpretation in the 2008 ANPR).14
To be sure, agencies may change their interpretations of
statutes and still receive Chevron deference. Similarly, an agency's
refusal to change an interpretation probably has limited legal
relevance, if any (though the Supreme Court has held that
"longstanding" interpretations are entitled to additional
deference, implying a preference for the status quo). '49
Nevertheless the EPA apparently acquiesced to a non-discretionary
interpretation of section 108 (a) (1) (C), then operated under that
assumption for more than thirty years. It only recently has shown
willingness to challenge that interpretation, and then only when a
court's rejection of its interpretation of a different part of the CAA
(in Massachusetts v. EPA) put the Agency into an uncomfortable
position. Whatever the legal relevance, these facts present the EPA
with a rhetorical challenge. It must confront them or the Agency
will appear to be twisting the meaning of the CAA for its own
convenience. Even if that perception has little effect on the
outcome of a suit over section 108(a) (1) (C), it may damage the
credibility of both the Agency and the CAA.
148. It is possible, of course, that the Agency has simply determined there are no
pollutants that it might want to regulate under section 202, section 211, or other sections
that would, under Train, trigger section 108. As discussed above, Congress amended the
CAA in 1977 to allow the EPA explicit regulation of pollutants under section 111 (NSPS)
without simultaneous regulation under the NAAQS. New pollutants regulated by the EPA
since Train have been regulated under this provision, or under section 112 (which
contains an exclusion preventing parallel regulation under the NAAQS). See 42 U.S.C. §
7412(b) (2) (Westlaw 2010).
149. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219-20 (2002) (showing long-term and




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
With congressional action on climate change apparently
paralyzed, the EPA is moving ahead with its section 202
Endangerment Finding and other initiatives. Thus, gradually, CAA
regulation of GHGs is moving from speculation to reality. Though
few believe that the CAA is an ideal tool for regulating stationary
sources of GHGs, it is widely (though not universally) viewed as a
plausible second-best alternative.15 ° Most who suggest that CAA
GHG regulation is practical, however, explicitly or implicitly
assume the EPA has a choice among the regulatory schemes in the
Act. Most commentators also agree that a NAAQS for GHGs would
create serious regulatory problems. Congress has recognized the
problem as well-the authority to issue a GHG NAAQS is explicitly
taken away from the EPA in the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill
that passed the House.'51
If the EPA does not have a choice among regulatory schemes
and is instead required by law to issue a NAAQS, and if Congress
does not act to prevent this (either through cap-and-trade
legislation or a separate "rifle shot" law that would surgically
correct perceived problems with the current statute), the Agency
will face significant administrative challenges while being
precluded from developing CAA GHG regulations that most claim
would be superior to the NAAQS.'52 To be sure, regulation of
GHGs through the NAAQS would not necessarily be a total
disaster: assuming the problems discussed above could be resolved,
the EPA might even be able to administer a cap-and-trade style
regulatory program through state SIPs, as it has done for
regulation of nitrous oxides.'53 Indeed, a small minority of
commentators feels that the NAAQS are at least part of their
preferred CAA regulatory program for GHGs. The prevailing view,
however, is that NAAQS are a very poor fit for regulation of GHG
emissions. They are such a poor fit, in fact, some argue that even if
the EPA loses a suit over the interpretation of section
108(a) (1) (C), the Agency could be saved from having to issue a
NAAQS by applying the "absurd results" canon.'54 This is the same
150. See supra text accompanying notes 53 and 64 (listing works in which GHG
regulation under the CAA is discussed as a viable alternative to new legislation).
151. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 831 (2009).
152. See, e.g., Daniels et al., supra note 55, at 10,838-39.
153. See supra text accompanying note 65.
154. See CHETrIAR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 39.
2010]
320 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
legal position advanced by the EPA in its proposed Tailoring Rule,
in which it is attempting to limit permitting requirements to
certain large GHG emitters despite clear CAA language to the
contrary.5 5 While a full analysis of the likelihood of success in
either case based on'the absurd results canon is beyond the scope
of this paper, the canon is rarely applied. It is not really so much a
legal "canon" as the Agency throwing itself at the" mercy of a court.
To the extent that it is a legal strategy at all, it is a strategy of last
resort.
The slow nature of the NAAQS process is a double-edged
sword. The EPA would not have to implement NAAQS-based
regulations (through the states) immediately, which would allow
some time for other regulations and/or congressional action to
resolve the problems discussed in this paper. At the same time, the
Agency might be distracted from efforts to regulate GHGs and
other pollutants while the NAAQS process continues. More
importantly, key regulatory tools that the EPA might use to
regulate GHGs under the CAA, particularly section 111(d)
performance standards for existing sources, would be unavailable
during this time due to preclusions in the CAA itself.
The EPA is also unlikely to be able to "sneak through" by
refusing to address the question. Some environmental groups,
seeing delay in regulation of stationary-source GHGs on other
fronts, will almost certainly file suit to compel the EPA to issue
GHG NAAQS as soon as the section 202 endangerment finding is
finalized (though other groups might support the EPA's claim of
discretion). Indeed, one group has already filed an administrative
petition with the EPA seeking such a result.56 Now that the section
202 Endangerment Finding has been finalized, the die has been
cast and the EPA will almost certainly have to defend its new
interpretation of section 108(a) (1) (C) in court.57
The EPA might win such a suit by claiming that Chevron entitles
it to essentially overrule the Second Circuit's holding in Train. For
all the reasons discussed above, however, this seems unlikely. It is
possible, however, that this type of suit will take so long that
Congress will eventually resolve the issue. While Chettiar and
Schwartz are somewhat more optimistic than I am that a court
would be able to distinguish Train and accept the EPA's
155. See Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 5, at 55,306-07.
156. See CM. FOR BIo. DIVERSITY & 350.oRG, supra note 12.
157. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 3.
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discretionary interpretation of section 108 (a) (1) (C), their broader
conclusion is very similar to the one I reach here, that, as they put
it:
[c]hoosing not to issue NAAQS for greenhouse gases may
be a risky strategy from both a legal and practical
perspective. Moreover, such an action could create a
dangerous precedent granting EPA too much discretion on
listing other criteria pollutants in the future. A legislative
fix to this potential problem may be necessary and
appropriate if EPA does not wish to pursue NAAQS for
greenhouse gases.
1 58
Of course, recent experience suggests that legislative inertia
should not be underestimated when it comes to climate change
issues. If Congress does not act - either to pass legislation that
would supersede the EPA's CAA authority over GHGs or to put in
effect a "rifle shot" law - regulation of GHGs under the CAA is
likely to create significant regulatory problems for the EPA and the
nation as a whole. 59 The EPA is currently trying to dodge one
oncoming regulatory train with its proposed Tailoring Rule.16 This
may or may not succeed. The Agency, Congress, regulated
industries, and the policy community should be aware that a
second train - lack of NAAQS discretion - is right behind.
The challenge presented by lack of EPA discretion over setting
a GHG NAAQS is twofold. First and most obviously, Congress
should act to resolve these issues by passing comprehensive climate
legislation or by surgical modification of the CAA with a "rifle
shot" law. Second, the academic and policy communities should
consider the possibility of regulating GHGs under the NAAQS
more seriously. While most scholars have rejected the NAAQS
158. CHETrIAR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 39.
159. Such a "rifle shot" might come in one of three varieties. First and most
obviously, Congress could remove GHGs from NAAQS consideration, as the Waxman-
Markey bill does. Second, the EPA could modify section 108(a) to explicitly grant the EPA
the discretion that it claims it has to decide whether a pollutant should be listed. Third,
Congress could adjust section 111 (d) so that performance standards for existing sources
could be issued even if a pollutant has been listed (either for all pollutants, or for GHGs
only). This last option would not solve the conceptual problems of a GHG NAAQS, but
would at least allow effective CAA regulation to proceed while those problems are solved.
Note also that "rifle shot" legislation has been proposed for the other significant problem
caused by the section 202 Endangerment Finding: triggering of PSD/NSR permitting for
small GHC sources (the problem the tailoring rule is designed to address).
160. See Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 5.
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relatively quickly, it may turn out to be both the first and only real
option for regulation of stationary-source GHGs under the CAA.
The NAAQS have been used to regulate other pollutants more or
less efficiently, most notably with the creation of a cap-and-trade
system for nitrous oxide. Despite the conceptual inconsistencies
and other problems presented by NAAQS in the GHG context, it is
possible that an effective regulatory program could be set up for
GHGs within the statutory limits of the NAAQS. More legal, policy,
and economic analysis needs to be done to determine.whether and
how this might be possible.
Errata
Page 140, line 14 should read, "negotiate treaties with foreign nations, and 3) the
right to. .. "
Page 140, line 19 should read, "support this "special solicitude,' 63 and noted that
Massachusetts . .. ."
Line 6 of footnote 74 on page 143 should read, "a public interest organization?")."
Page -150, line 12 should read, "them sovereignty to one degree or another. So what
does ......
Line 5 of footnote 122 on page 154 should read, "A just war requires, first and
foremost, a just cause, such as self-defense, recovering stolen ....
Line 6 of footnote 196 on page 168 should read,
"http://www.msaj.com/papers/feddeleg.htm."

